As a result, memory encryption and tree-based authentication techniques, e.g., Merkle trees , Parallelizable Authentication Trees (PAT) and Tamper Evident Counter (TEC) trees, are increasingly deployed to protect data in RAM. In these cases, the attacker can, for example, observe and tamper with data in RAM. These schemes successfully prevent attackers from accessing memory content when the device is shut off and the encryption key is not present on the device, e.g., an encrypted USB flash drive.Ĭontrary to that, in many situations in the Internet of Things (IoT), a physical attacker is in possession of a running device, or can turn a device on. Typical encryption schemes employed in these systems are Cipher-Block-Chaining with Encrypted Salt-Sector IV (CBC-ESSIV) , Xor-Encrypt-Xor (XEX) , and XEX-based Tweaked codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing (XTS) .
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It is widely deployed in state-of-the-art systems, such as in iOS , Android , Mac OS X , Windows , and Linux .
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Memory encryption is the standard technique to protect data and code against attackers with physical access to a memory. We implement and evaluate both instances on a Zynq XC7Z020 FPGA showing that Meas has memory and performance overhead comparable to existing memory authentication techniques without DPA protection. For RAM, we give two concrete Meas instances based on the lightweight primitives Ascon, PRINCE, and QARMA. Meas is applicable to all kinds of memory, e.g., NVM and RAM. Meas prevents higher-order DPA without changes to the cipher implementation by using masking of the plaintext values. Therefore, the design strictly limits the use of every key to encrypt at most two different plaintext values. The scheme combines ideas from fresh re-keying and authentication trees by storing encryption keys in a tree structure to thwart first-order DPA without the need for DPA-protected cryptographic primitives. In this work, we present Meas-the first Memory Encryption and Authentication Scheme providing security against DPA attacks. However, many current memory encryption schemes can be broken using differential power analysis (DPA). Memory encryption is used in many devices to protect memory content from attackers with physical access to a device.
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